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The definition of meditation (or yoga) by Patanjali as “restriction (or stilling) of the fluctuations
of the mind” (cf, Woods, 1927/2003, p. xxx, 8) may be an appropriate starting point for research
on meditation using fMRI. An operational definition of the neural substrate of meditation which
is adequate to Patanjalis definition, may be developed on the basis of a non-reductionistic
understanding of the neural underpinnings of the mind in terms of dynamical functional brain
systems.
Awasthi (2013) argue that Patanjali belongs to a dualistic philosophical tradition (Sankhya), in
which meditation is a spiritual phenomenon, inaccessible to objective research. But in the Sankhya
philosophy, an intimate relationship is assumed to exist between the spiritual, includingmeditation,
and the material concomitants of states of mind (Rao, 2011). Further, Patanjali suggested that
a number of persistently motivated goal-directed sensory-motor activities, and socially oriented
moral and mental exercises, must be accomplished in order to reach meditation (Woods,
1927/2003, p. xxx–xxxi, 34ff). Since neuroscience considers objectively measurable phenomena
only, it may thus be impossible to investigate meditation as such, but the material concomitants
of the mind during meditation and preceding exercises may be as accessible to objective research
as during other states of mind. While the social and moral issues calls for other methods, some
of the mental and concomitant sensory-motor exercises are accessible for objective neuroscientific
investigation.
Awasthi (2013) and Rao (2011) express the need for a clear and commonly accepted definition
of meditation to get beyond the present situation of mixed, and to some extent contradictory
results. Increased attention to the practical details of the investigated specific forms of meditation,
is necessary. They suggest an explicit consideration of what is meant by “meditation,” and of the
corporeal operational details of the investigated activity, in order not to confuse various kinds and
levels of meditation with each other. This is clearly relevant, and merits serious attention, but a
thorough discussion of this topic is not possible here.
Another methodological problem also needs careful consideration. Most current research
into meditation using PET, SPECT, or fMRI uses the contrastive method. The brain is scanned
during various different states (at least two), one of which is the target state (meditation), and
the other(s) some different state(s) of mind. The result is reached by subtracting the contrast
state from the target state (cf, Raichle, 1998), and usually reported as (networks of) brain areas
displaying increased or decreased activity levels during meditation. Although the results are usually
described as information about the target state (meditation), they actually inform about relative
differences in local brain activities related to changes of mind between various cognitive activities,
including “mind wandering,” into the target state, attempted meditation (e.g., Bærentsen et al.,
2010; Hasenkamp et al., 2012).
Simple arithmetic tells us that the result of this subtraction depends on both the subtrahend and
the minuend, and the result is informative about the difference, not about the target state as such.
Although some consensus has been reached, results may depart substantially from each other (cf,
Cahn and Polich, 2006; Neumann and Frasch, 2006; Ivanovski andMalhi, 2007; Ospina et al., 2007;
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Tang et al., 2012). To some degree reflecting the confusion as to
precisely what kind of meditative activity is investigated, and the
contrasts that are used (Rao, 2011; Awasthi, 2013).
But maps of local activations and deactivations during
“meditation” obtained with contrastive fMRI brain imaging only
inform us of about approximately 1–5 % local variations in
the level of neural activity (Raichle and Gusnard, 2005; Raichle
and Mintun, 2006; Raichle, 2009). These variations are relevant,
but contrary to what is often implicitly believed, the contrastive
analysis provides us with no knowledge about the (equally
intense) concurrent activity in the rest of the brain, apart from
the fact, that there is no statistically significant difference in the
level of neural activity between the contrasted states. But this is
not information, that activity in the rest of the brain is irrelevant
to the investigated states of mind, nor about what possible
relation this ongoing activity may have to the investigated state
of mind. Attempts to go beyond the concepts of activation and
deactivation of local areas are represented by investigations of
functional connectivity (e.g., Farb et al., 2007; Brewer et al.,
2011; Hasenkamp and Barsalou, 2012; Pagnoni, 2012; Taylor
et al., 2013; Josipovic, 2014), but although interesting, a thorough
consideration of these efforts is impossible here.
Patanjalis definition consider meditation and its obstacles,
i.e., flutuations of the mind. According to Patanjali, five types
of fluctuations of mind should be overcome in order to attain
concentration (meditation): (1) veridical cognition on the basis
of perception, logical reasoning, and verbal communication,
(2) illusory imagination, (3) linguistic conceptualizations, (4)
sleep, and (5) memory (Woods, 1927/2003; Rao, 2011, p. xxx,
17ff). These fluctuations corresponds to, roughly speaking, the
full range of mental states which the mind may pass through
during normal life activity as they are described in modern
psychology.
All of these different “states of mind” in activity are more
or less goal-directed (e.g. internally vs. externally defined)
and characterized by continuously changing constellations of
motivations, goal-related cognition-emotion, and operational
regulatory mental and sensory-motor processes (Leont’ev, 1974;
Leontev, 1978). They are realized by task-related functional brain
systems integrating functionally differentiated and anatomically
distributed areas of the whole brain, not by patches of local
“activated” areas (Brodmann, 1909/1985; Vygotsky, 1934/1997;
Anokhin, 1969, 1974; Luria, 1973; Edelman and Tononi, 2000;
Freeman, 2000; Raichle and Gusnard, 2005). The evolution of
the functional brain systems is reflected in changing patterns of
local activations and deactivations as revealed by fMRI. They
correspond to the establishment and dissolution of functional
synchronization of neural activity in distributed local populations
of synapses (Magri et al., 2012), reflecting changes in intentional
focus, emotional coloring, cognitive strategies, and processing
routines etc. One example is the change from mind wandering
(whatever its specific content) into concentration on a chosen
meditative focus (e.g., Guo and Pagnoni, 2008; Bærentsen, 2011;
Hasenkamp et al., 2012).
Even if it would be possible to control the exact nature of the
momentary meditative focus and the qualitative contents of the
contrasting “mind wandering” episode, it is however unlikely,
that any two instances would be reflected in identical patterns
of local activations and deactivations (cf, McGonigle et al.,
2000). Meditation as such is probably not reflected in a specific
momentary pattern of “activations” and “deactivations,” as these
are currently understood. But meditation may correspond to
a specific kind of global dynamic of changing systems of
coactivated brain areas, and this dynamic may be different from
those that corresponds to the five mentioned “fluctuations”
during mundane states of consciousness.
Patanjali may view meditation as a spiritual phenomenon,
but it is not stated in the sutras that the material concomitants
of mind are irrelevant to the mentioned fluctuations, nor that
they cease to exist if the spirit eventually attains liberation.
Although different schools of meditation use specific techniques
and procedures (Focused Attention, Open Monitoring, Nondual
Awarenes etc., cf, Josipovic, 2014), the ultimate aim always
includes some form of “restriction (or stilling) of the fluctuations
of the mind.” Assuming that meditation entails brain activity
that differ from common resting or various goal-directed mental
activities including various techniques of meditation exercise
(Guo and Pagnoni, 2008; Bærentsen, 2011; Hasenkamp et al.,
2012), neuroscience research may try to unveil the dynamic
characteristics of the material concomitants of mind during
various kinds and levels of meditation (cf, Rao, 2011), with or
without the use of the contrastive method (cf, Beckmann et al.,
2005; Guo and Pagnoni, 2008; Smith et al., 2009).
Meditation is a whole-brain (body) activity and needs
characterization in terms of whole brain dynamics. The research
strategy might follow the non-reductionist proposal of Edelman
(2003) and Edelman and Tononi (2000 p. 18f) and concentrate
on the brain processes, not just the brain areas, that support
consciousness, and examine what kind of neural interactions
may explain the fundamental properties of consciousness
such as phenomenological unity, differentiation, variability and
informativeness, that may reveal characteristics conforming to
the phenomenological descriptions of the target states (e.g., rest
vs. various forms and states of meditation).
In terms of dynamical systems, states of mind may be
considered and understood as temporary stable patterns of
activity, i.e., as trajectories in bounded regions of a state space
created by the evolution of the global patterns of activity
in the brain (cf, Edelman and Tononi, 2000; Freeman, 2000;
Haken and Schiepek, 2010). Each state may be of varying
temporal duration, and more or less stable according to the
characteristics of the attractors and control parameters (e.g.,
arousal, motivation, concentration, skill). In stable states, it will
remain in a bounded area of state space. During state transitions
it may reveal characteristic instabilities etc. States like mind
wandering and meditation may pertain to various phases and
show characteristic patterns of stability, fluctuations, instabilities,
transitions between states, etc.
The descriptions given by Patanjali provides references to
which types of states could be compared. These conventional
states of mind define trajectories in the brain’s state space—and
may well be described as “fluctuations” therein, more or less
intense according to the level of wakefulness, the amount of drive,
levels of motivation or intensity of emotional content etc. They
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may be more or less coherent, integrated, and stable according
to the level of concentration on the intended goal or direction,
and they may be more or less qualitatively differentiated and
encompassing according to the level of operational sensory-
motor coordination to the situational conditions, and their
emotional color.
In everyday activities, conscious attention may be variously
focused on a particular intentional goal to achieve, a problem
to solve, the aesthetic or emotional qualities of a situation, etc.
During resting when no explicit goal is aimed at, attention is
moving from one topic to another and focus on varying qualities
and aspects of imagined situations according to drives, previous
experiences, distractions and random influences (cf, Smallwood
and Schooler, 2006; Schooler et al., 2011) as reflected in the
fluctuations in ongoing brain activity (Raichle, 2011).
During the practice of meditation one may suddenly realize
that the mind has been caught by thoughts about some issue and
that awareness of the present situation and the goal has faded.
In such cases the mind may be refocused on the situation and
the intended action when awareness of the distraction emerges
in consciousness (Hasenkamp et al., 2012). The contents of
perception or thoughts, and the focus of conscious attention or
mind, may not be identical, and during the transition from one
issue to the other, it is not residing in neither of the contents
(Schooler et al., 2011). Before and after the transition however,
the conscious mind usually resides in (i.e., identifies with) the
content, i.e., the fluctuations, and these fluctuations are reflected
in the measurable activity of the brain (Hasson et al., 2004).
It may be expected, that the fluctuations are large, when
the mind is caught emotionally and engages in cognitive
imagination with a rich and varied qualitative content. When
meditation is achieved, the mind does—according to Patanjali—
not identify with these “fluctuations,” and the concomitant
fluctuations of brain activity are possibly minimal (controlled,
stilled, suppressed), as reflected in the Buddhist expression
“The flame will only burn steadily when we can calm the air
around it. . .when we have stilled the turbulence of our thoughts
and emotions” (Rinpoche, 1992, p. 64). But if “stillness” is
conceived of as “being balanced” in relation to fluctuations
and disturbances, it may actually be expressed in compensatory
activities to counterbalance these influences. “once we have found
a stability in our meditation, noises and disturbances of every
kind will have far less impact” (Rinpoche, 1992, ibid.).
Stillness may be understood as controlled variability
counterbalancing “fluctuations” of the mind (Hasenkamp et al.,
2012), which is reminiscent of the discussion about whether
“stilling the fluctuations” or “relaxation” entails lowering arousal,
which seems not to be the case (Bærentsen et al., 2010; Amihai
and Kozhevnikov, 2014).
How the different states of mind may be reflected in the
different measurable fluctuations of global brain processes is a
question to be asked.
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